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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
INDIANS-CRIMES BY INDIANS OUT OF INDIAN COUNTRY OR
RESERVATION-JURISDICTION OF STATE TO ARREST INDIAN ON THE
RESERVATION-Petitioner, an enrolled member of the Devils Lake
Sioux Tribe, was arrested without a warrant on the Fort Totten
Indian reservation by a Ramsey County deputy sheriff on February
3, 1968.1 The deputy sheriff incarcerated the petitioner in the
Ramsey County jail and filed a complaint the next day charging
petitioner with larceny of an automobile. The alleged offense pre-
sumably was committed in Ramsey County outside the exterior
boundaries of the Fort Totten reservation. Petitioner subsequently
sought his release by means of a writ of habeas corpus, claiming
that the deputy sheriff had no authority to make the arrest as the
state had no jurisdiction over the Fort Totten reservation.2  The
writ was quashed by the Ramsey County District Court. In an
original proceeding for habeas corpus, the North Dakota Supreme
Court held that the state had jurisdiction to arrest the petitioner on
the reservation for an alleged offense committed off the reservation
and quashed the writ. Fournier v. Roed, 161 N.W.2d 458 (N.D. 1968).
On March 3, 1966, a theft of some jewelry was reported by
born, 370 Mich. 47, 120 N.W.2d 737 (1963). The cases concern the use of a corridor for
the alleged purpose of discriminatory exclusion. The former case was initiated before
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) and the latter arose after Lightfoot. Although
they concern incorporation rather than annexation they are useful examples of judicial
concern with regard to changing municipal boundaries.
1. The opinion does not state whether the arrest was made pursuant to the "fresh
pursuit" doctrine. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-06-05 (1960).
2. It is interesting to note that in 1946, the Congress granted North Dakota concur-
rent criminal jurisdiction with the federal government over Fort Totten Indian reserva-
tion. 60 Stat. 229 (1946). But in State v. Lohnes, 69 N.W.2d 508 (N.D. 1955), the court
held that before such Jurisdiction could be effective the people of North Dakota had to
indicate their consent to accept such Jurisdiction by amending § 203 of the state constitu-
tion which provided that:
The people inhabitating the state do agree and declare that they forever dis-
claim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying within the
boundaries thereof, and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held
by any Indian or Indian tribes, and that until the title thereto shall have
been extinguished by the United States, the same shall be and remain sub-
ject to the disposition of the United States, and that said Indian lands shall
remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the congress of the
United States ....
The state never accepted criminal jurisdiction over Fort Totten Indian reser-
vation although § 203 of the constitution was amended in 1959 to allow the state, under
such terms and conditions as the state deemed proper, to accept jurisdiction over the In-
dian lands as Congress may delegate. N.D. SEss. LAws ch. 430 (1959). The amendment
was in response to § 6 of Public Law 280 of the 83rd Congress, 67 Stat. 690 (1953), which
allowed states such as North Dakota to unilaterally assume civil and criminal Jurisdiction
over the Indian reservations provided that the state removed any constitutional impedi-
ments such as represented by § 203 of the North Dakota Constittulon. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162
(1964) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1964).
In 1963 the legislature acted to accept civil jurisdiction over the Indian reservations,
but not criminal Jurisdiction. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 27-19 (Supp. 1967). The state did
not make assumption of Jurisdiction a unilateral act (as allowed by Public Law 280) but
rather required that the Indians first consent to the extension of state Jurisdiction over
their lands. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-19-01 (Supp. 1967). As yet, no tribe in North Dakota
has consented to state jurisdiction to this writer's knowledge. Hence, the state has no
civil or criminal Jurisdiction over any of the reservations.
In 1968, Congress ended the possibility of unilateral assumption of state Jurisdiction
over Indian reservations bly requiring that the states secure the Indians consent as a pre-
requisite to assumption of jurisdiction. Act of April 11, 1968, §§ 401-02, 82 Stat. 78, 79.
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the Crosby Jewelry store in Rolla, North Dakota. Rolla is situated
in close proximity to the Turtle Mountain Indian reservation. The
sheriff of Rolette County was notified shortly thereafter by Indian
police on the reservation that a Melvin Poitra had attempted to
pawn a watch in a Belcourt bar. Belcourt is located within the
exterior boundaries of the Turtle Mountain reservation. The sheriff,
accompanied by a clerk of the jewelry store, entered the reserva-
tion and were joined by Indian officers. Mr. Poitra was found and
the clerk identified him as the person who was present in the store
at the approximate time of the offense. A search of the car re-
vealed some of the jewelry items taken from the store. The sheriff
arrested Mr. Poitra and took him from the reservation immediately
without consulting with tribal officials. Poitra was later convicted
of grand larceny in the state courts and sentenced to the state
penitentiary. On September 1, 1967, the United States Commissioner
of Indian Affairs requested the Solicitor of the Department of the
Interior to institute proceedings with the United States Attorney
General to secure Poitra's release. It was the Commissioner's con-
tention that Poitra had been illegally arrested by a state officer on
the reservation. In a memorandum opinion, the Solicitor's office
found no basis for questioning the arrest and advised the Commis-
sioner that a state officer had the authority to arrest an Indian on
the reservation for an offense committed off the reservation, not-
withstanding the lack of state criminal jurisdiction over the reser-
vation. I.D. Sol. Mem. Op. M-36717 (Dec. 22, 1967).
The North Dakota Supreme Court did not refer to the Solicitor's
opinion and it is therefore assumed that the court was unaware of
the identical position reached by the Solicitor on a similar factual
situation. The unanimity of result reached by the federal agency
responsible for the administration of Indian affairs and the supreme
court of a state with a large Indian population is a significant
display of federal and state solidarity in an important aspect of
Indian law. The precise question involved in the two decisions was
one of first impression and for which no precedent could be found
from any other court or administrative body. With this fact in
mind, the decisions are even more remarkable.
In both cases, the alleged crime was committed off the reser-
vation. It has long been settled that a crime committed by an
Indian while away from the reservation is a matter of state juris-
diction.8 The fact that an Indian committed the offense has no
3. Pablo v. People, 23 Colo. 134, 46 P. 636 (1896) ; Ex Parte Moore, 28 S.D. 339, 133
N.W. 817 (1911): State v. La Barge, 234 Wis. 449, 291 N.W. 299 (1940).
In 1885, a federal statute was enacted which gave the territories the power to
prosecute Indians for the crimes of murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to
kill, arson, burglary, and larceny whether the crime was committed on or off the reserva-
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special significance. Hence, the Solicitor and the North Dakota
Supreme Court were faced only with the issue of whether a North
Dakota peace officer has the authority to enter a reservation over
which the state has no criminal jurisdiction to arrest an Indian
for a misdeed done off the reservation without first securing the
permission of tribal officials to arrest the offender or otherwise
recognizing any interest of the tribal government in the matter.
The fundamental basis for both decisions was the conclusion
that "Indian reservations are not extraterritorial to the states where-
in they are located." 4 Both decisions relied heavily on Organized
Village of Kake v. Egan5 wherein the United States Supreme
Court stated that state laws may be applied on the reservation to
the extent that such laws "would [not] interfere with reservation
self-government or impair a right granted or reserved by federal
law.'
6
The North Dakota Supreme Court, in addition to the territori-
ality argument, chose to frame the issue in more emotional tones.
The court stated that:
[W]hat is involved is whether the state courts will be
able to be effective in performing their function, or whether
they will become helpless when an offense is committed off
the reservation by an Indian who escapes to the reservation
before he is apprehended.
Is the State, through its failure to assume full criminal
jurisdiction on Indian reservations, now to be deprived
of the exercise of its sovereign power of the enforcement
of law and order within its boundaries outside the Indian
reservations?7
The court answered its question by holding that where the
enforcement of law and order was involved, the state would not be
powerless to act on the reservation in the absence of a treaty or
federal statute prohibiting such action.8 Moreover, the court noted
that since Indians are now enjoying the status of citizens in North
Dakota, they should also be required to assume the duties of citizen-
ship such as obeying the laws of the state while off the reservation. 9
Aside from the emotional appeal of the court, both the Solicitor's
tion. Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 385. The federal government reserved to
itself the power to prosecute indians for the above enumerated crimes if committed on the
reservation, and within the boundaries of any state. The power of the states to prosecute
crimes committed by Indians off the reservation was not mentioned in the 1885 statute,
but it is safe to presume that such power was implicitly recognized by Congress.
4. I.D. got. Mem. Op. M-36717 (Dec. 22, 1967) at 3; Fournier v. Roed, 161 N.W.2d
458, 466 (N.D. 1968).
5. 869 U.S. 60 (1962).
6. Id. at 75.
7. Fournier v. Roed, 161 N.W.2d 468, 465 (N.D. 1968).
8. Id. at 465.
9. Id. at 466.
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opinion and the court's decision have considerable support in the
law, especially regarding the territorial concept. In order to prop-
erly understand the relationship between the Indian reservations
and the states where they are located, a historical perspective is
necessary. The Fort Totten Indian reservation will be given par-
ticular emphasis.
Until 1871, the United States dealt with the Indian tribes by
treaty,10 recognizing the tribes as sovereign powers. The various
reservations created by treaties were treated as dependent nations
within the states or territories where they were located.1" Evidence
of this was manifested in the statutory requirement, 12 repealed in
1934,13 of a passport issued by the Department of the Interior
for anyone wishing to enter the reservations.
In many of the treaties, there was express language to the
effect that the reservation lands formed no part of the state or
territory where they were located and could only be included as a
part of the state or territory involved with the permission of the
Indians residing on such reservation."4 In 1861, the Organic Law
for the Territory of Dakota provided that:
[N]othing is this act contained shall be construed to impair
the rights of person or property now pertaining to the
Indians in said Territory, so long as such rights shall remain
unextinguished by treaty between the United States and
such Indians, or to include any territory which, by treaty
with any Indian tribe, is not, without the consent of said
tribe, to be included within the territorial limits or juris-
diction of any State or Territory; but all such territory
shall be excepted out of the boundaries and constitute no
part of the Territory of Dakota, until said tribe shall signify
their assent to the President of the United States to be
included within the said Territory .... 15
The Fort Totten Indian reservation was not in existence when
the Dakota Territory was established in 1861. When the reservation
was created by treaty in 1867,16 the territory comprising the reser-
vation consisted of unappropriated public lands. Article IV of the
treaty did not specify that the reservation was to form no part of
10. The treaty making era ended in 1871, 16 Stat. 566 (1871), 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1964),
but that is not to say that the obligations created by treaty were no longer enforced. In-
deed, in the instant case, the North Dakota Supreme Court conceded that if a treaty pro-
vision prohibited the state from entering the reservation to arrest Fournier, the treaty
would prevail. Fournier v. Roed, 161 N.W.2d 458, 465 (N.D. 1968).
11. Worcester v. Georgia, 81 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 556 (1831).
12. R.S. § 2134, (1878).
13. Act of May 21, 1934, ch. 321, 48 Stat. 787.
14. See, e.g., Treaty with the Cherokee Indians, art. 5, 7 Stat. 481 (1835) ; Treaty with
the Choctaw Nation, art. IV, 7 Stat. 334 (1830).
15. Act of March 2, 1861, ch. 86, 12 Stat. 289 (emphais added).
16. 15 Stat. 505 (1867).
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the Territory of Dakota but only stated that the lands were to be
"set apart" for the use of the Indians. 1 7 "Set apart" has been
construed by one court as being synonymous with "dedicated" and
such language does not indicate an intent to create a separate
political entity apart from the state but rather to appropriate certain
public lands for a particular use, such as a reservation.1 8
17. Id.
18. Yellowstone Park Transportation Co. v. Gallatin County, 27 F.2d 410 (D. Mont.
1928). The case was overruled, however, by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals a short
time later [see 31 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 555 (1929)]. The court
indicated that when Montana ceded complete Jurisdiction over a portion of its territory to
the United States, the jurisdiction of Montana was completely inoperative in the ceded
territory except such Jurisdiction as the state reserved. The court did not deal with the
term, "set apart", as the district court defined It.
The court of appeals also stated that the "sole and exclusive jurisdiction" in the
federal government over Yellowstone National Park is inconsistent with any theory of
concurrent jurisdiction by the state over such lands. Id. at 646.
In Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 650, 651 (1929), the Court stated that:
It is not unusual for the United States to own within a State lands which
are set apart and used for public purposes. Such ownership and use without
more do not withdraw the lands from the jurisdiction of the State. On the
contrary, the lands remain part of her territory and within the operation of
her laws, save the latter cannot affect the title of the United States or em-
barrass it in using the lands or interfere with its right of disposal.
A typical illustration is found in the usual Indian reservation set apart
from a State as a place where the United States may care for its Indian
wards and lead them into habits and ways of civilized life. Such reservations
are part of the State within which they lie and her laws, civil and criminal,
have the same force therein as elsewhere within her limits, save that they
can have restricted application to the Indian wards.
In State v. Denoyer, 6 N.D. 586, 72 N.W. 1014, 1016 (1897) the North Dakota Su-
preme Court drew a distinction between lands ceded to the federal government and oc-
cupied as a fort, arsenal, or other such purpose as allowed by art I, § 8, clause 17 of the
United States Constitution, and the public lands generally:
In the former cases Jurisdiction is exclusive for all purposes. Persons residing
upon such tracts are not regarded as citizens of the state that may surround
such tracts. They can claim none of the privileges and immunities given by
the laws of such state. Nor can the state courts punish for any crime com-
mitted upon the tract by whomsoever committed, and, unless the right is spe-
cially reserved, state officials cannot enter upon a tract for the purpose of
serving a warrant of arrest for a crime committed elsewhere, or for the pur-
pose of serving any process whatever. (emphasis supplied)
The court concluded that an Indian reservation was created for a special purpose
but that federal Jurisdiction was not exclusive over the reservation. The United States had
retained only such jurisdiction necessary for the disposition of and title to the land, the
fulfilling of treaty obligations, and the protection of the Indians.
Section 204 of the North Dakota Constitution specifically provides for areas within
the state which are used for forts, arsenals, and other areas that the Denoyer court men-
tioned as being exclusively federal islands within the state. The specific constitutional res-
ervation of Jurisdiction is interesting:
Jurisdiction is ceded to the United States over the military reservations of
Fort Abraham Lincoln, Fort Buford, Fort Pembina and Fort Totten [not In-
cluding the Indian reservation], heretofore declared by the president of the
United States; provided, legal process, civil and criminal, of this state, shall
extend over such reservations in all cases in which exclusive Jurisdiction is
not vested In the United States, or of crimes not committed within the limits
of such reservations.
If Jurisdiction over such federal areas as arsenals is plenary, and the state only
has such jurisdiction as may be specifically reserved by constitution or statute, it would
seem, according to the Denoyer case, that the other public lands appropriated for purposes
suq1h as Indian reservations, hold no special jurisdictional problems for the state. But even
in the national parks, which are part of the public domain, the federal government has
specifically spelled out the states' jurisdiction over such lands. For example, concerning
Mt. Ranier National Park, it is provided that:
Sole and exclusive jurisdiction is assumed by the United States Over the
territory embraced within the Mount Ranier National Park, saving, however,
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In 1880, the United States Supreme Court held that where a
treaty with the Nez Perce tribe did not contain a clause excepting
the reservation from the boundaries of Utah, the state's jurisdiction
extended to the reservation, at least to the extent that process could
be served there on non-Indians. 19 The Court implied, however, that
Indians on the reservation might not be amenable to the state's
jurisdiction. The case merely stands for the proposition that where
non-Indian interests are involved, the state is not precluded from
exercising its jurisdiction over territory, albeit an Indian reserva-
tion, which is within the exterior boundaries of the state and has
not been specifically excepted therefrom by any treaty provision.
Applying the principle of Langford v. Monteith to the instant case,
there can be little doubt that the Fort Totten Indian reservation
is a physical part of North Dakota and the state arguably has the
power to apply its law on the reservation as long as such application
does not "interfere with reservation self-government or impair a
right granted or reserved by federal law." As noted previously,
the territorial concept of the reservation as a part of the state
wherein it is located, was the cornerstone of the instant decisions'
holdings that a state could arrest an Indian on the reservation for
an alleged offense committed off the reservation without any per-
mission from tribal authorities.
Even though the state might have territorial jurisdiction over
the reservation, both the Solicitor and the supreme court were still
faced with the question as to whether the state action interfered with
tribal self-government or violated a treaty or federal law. Neither
the court nor the Solicitor found any such impediment in view of
the fact that the alleged offenses were committed off the reser-
to the State of Washington the right to serve civil or criminal process within
the limits of aforesaid park in suits or prosecutions for or on account of
rights acquired, obligations incurred, or crimes committed in said state but
outside of said park .... All the laws applicable to places under the sole and
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States shall have force and effect in said
park. All fugitives from justice taking refuge in said park shall be subject
to the same laws as refugees from justice found in the State of Washington.
39 Stat. 243 (1916), 16 U.S.C. § 95 (1964). For similar provisions, see 39 Stat. 521 (1916),
16 U.S.C. § 124 (1964) [Crater Lake National Park]; 45 Stat. 1536 (1929), 16 U.S.C. §
198 (1964) [Rocky Mountain National Park].
Since such specific statements of federal jurisdiction are contained in the statutes
dealing with that part of the public lands used for parks, It is arguable that the federal
government does not, as Denoyer suggests, assume plenary jurisdiction only over arsenals
and forts, but assumes complete jurisdiction over all of the public domain appropriated
for particular purposes save that which is granted to or reserved by the states. As the
above statute dealing with Mt. Ranier National Park indicates, the state is given power
to serve process, civil and criminal, within the park for acts committed outside the park, In
accordance with the reservation of jurisdiction contained in WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. §
37.08.200 (1964), ceding exclusive jurisdiction of the park area to the federal government.
Section 203 of the North Dakota Constitution, vesting "absolute jurisdiction" over Indian
lands in the federal government, does not reserve any similar jurisdiction in the state of
North Dakota. Therefore, It could be argued that the state has no jurisdiction to serve
criminal or civil process on the Indian reservations in the absence of an authorizing fed-
eral statute. See Yellowstone Park Transportation Co. v. Gallatin County, 31 F.2d 644
(9th Cir. 1929, cert. denied, 280 U.S. 555 (1929).
19. Langford v. Monteith, 102 U.S. 145, 147 (1880).
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vation. Therefore, it was impliedly held that the tribal government
had no interest in a tribal member's depredations off the reservation
superior to that of the state's interest in taking the offender from
the reservation without first requesting tribal officials to surrender
the suspect.
Tribal self-government is a somewhat elusive term and dif-
ficult to define. Since 1934, under the guiding provisions of the
Wheeler-Howard Act,2 0 the federal government has reversed its
prior policy of integrating the Indians and their reservations into
contemporary white society by means of the allotment system 21
and has chosen instead to follow a policy of strengthening tribal
relationships.22 Under the Wheeler-Howard Act, most of the tribes
adopted constitutions and entered into a new era of self-government
with only the federal government as a superior power able to limit
the Indians' exercise of self-governmental functions.28 One author
has stated that the powers of Indian self-government
include the power . . . to adopt and operate under a form
of government of the Indians' choosing, to define conditions
of tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations of
members, to prescribe rules of inheritance, to levy taxes,
to regulate property within the jurisdiction of the tribe, to
control the conduct of members by municipal legislation,
and to administer justice.2 4
If the Indian tribes are truly sovereign entities with the con-
commitant power to administer law and order on their reservations,
it would appear that a tribe has a legitimate interest in the conduct
of an alleged offender against state law who is present on the
reservation. Moreover, is it not reasonable to assume, under the
banner of sovereignty, that the tribal government should at least
be consulted before any tribal member is taken from the reservation
to answer for a crime allegedly committed off the reservation? If
Indian sovereignty does not extend this far, then section 1841 of
the Navajo Tribal Code is indeed a futile exercise:
Whenever the Chairman of the Tribal Council is informed
and believes that an Indian has committed a crime outside
of Indian country in Arizona, New Mexico, or Utah and is
present on the Navajo Reservation using it as an asylum
from prosecution by the state, the Chairman may order
any Navajo policeman to apprehend such Indian and deliver
20. 48 Stat. 984 (1934), 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1964).
21.; General Allotment Act, 24 Stat. 388, as amended, 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-58 (1964).
22. Of. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 73 (1961).
23. For a list of those tribes adopting constitutions under the Wheeler-Howard Act,
see U.S. DEP'T. OF THE INT RioR, FVDERAL IxnssN LAw 409 n. 29 (Oceana reprint 1966).
24, Cohen, Indian Rights and the Federal Courts, 24 MrN. I. Rv. 145, 147 (1940).
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him to the proper state authorities at the Reservation
boundary.2
5
Section 1842 provides that:
If any person being arrested as provided in section 1841
of this title so demands, he shall be taken by the arresting
policeman to the nearest Court of the Navajo Tribe, where
the judge shall hold a hearing, and if it appears that there
is no probable cause to believe the Indian guilty of the
crime with which he is charged off the reservation, or if
it appears that the Indian probably will not receive a fair
trial in the state court, the judge shall order the Indian
released from custody.2
The 1868 treaty with the Navajos did not contain a provision
that the reservation was to form no part of the surrounding states. 27
It would therefore appear that the Navajo reservation has a similar
status to the Fort Totten reservation, and would also be subject
to the state's jurisdiction under the territorial concept. But the
Navajos evidently consider the control of an Indian on the reservation
who has committed an offense off the reservation as a matter
affecting their right of self-government. It is doubtful that a state,
in the exercise of its sovereign powers, would not come to a similar
conclusion if one of its citizens was taken from the state to answer
for an offense committed elsewhere. If it were otherwise, there
would be no need for the constitutional 2s and statutory 2 proce-
dures regarding extradition among the states and territories.
Although some of the treaties with the Indian tribes contained
specific provisions regarding extradition of Indians from the reser-
vations,80 there is no case which this writer has found involving
the question of whether a state can use extradition proceedings to
secure the custody of an Indian offender on the reservation in the
25. NAVAJO TRIBAL CODE, tit 17, § 1841 (1962). The explanatory material following
the section states that
[e]xisting law provides no method whereby Indians alleged to have commit-
ted crimes off the NavaJo Reservation, and fled into a part of the Reserva-
tion in the same state where the alleged crime occurred, can be arrested
for such crimes and delivered to the proper state authorities for trial, and
similarly there is no method whereby Indians who have committed offenses
on the Reservation and fled off the Reservation can be arrested and brought
to trial In the Tribal Courts, and
(2) Unless such situation is remedied the Reservation may become an
asylum for criminals, and Tribal law and order may be subverted.
The material goes on to urge the Secretary of the Interior to request legislation from
Congress authorizing the Navajo tribe to execute extradition agreements with the states.
See also TURTLE MOUNTAIN TamIAL CODE § 1.0710 (1968).
26. NAVAJO TRIBAL CoDn, tit. 17, § 1842 (1962).
27. Treaty with the Navaos, 15 Stat. 667 (1868).
28. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, clause 2.
29. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-95 (1964).
3k Treaty with the Cherokee Nation, art. 11, 7 Stat. 39 (1791); Treaty with the
Wiandots, art. 6, 7 Stat. 28 (1789).
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absence of a treaty provision allowing extradition.3' In 1833, how-
ever, a federal district court held that the Governor of Arkansas
was not authorized to honor a demand from the chief of the Cherokee
Nation for the extradition to the reservation of a person who al-
legedly committed a crime there. 32 The court held that an Indian
reservation is neither a state nor a territory and therefore not
within the constitutional and statutory terms concerning interstate
extradition.3 3 The court reached its conclusion by examining the
relevant treaty and found that the Cherokee reservation contained
a clause which excepted the reservation lands from the territorial
limits of any state or territory.3 4 Query if the result of the case
would have been different had the reservation been included as a
part of the state where it is located such as the Fort Totten reser-
vation.
The court also noted that states and territories are populated
by citizens of the United States and the reservations are not, as
further authority for the conclusion that a reservation is not a state
or a territory.3 5  Since 1924, Indians have enjoyed the status of
United States citizens.3 6 The reasons for the holding of Ex Parte
Morgan having largely disappeared, it might be well to end its
long life at this point by allowing extradition between the states
and the Indian reservations.3 7 Such a result would properly recog-
31. Notwithstanding any treaty provisions, the following statute, repealed by the Act
of May 21, 1934, ch. 321, 48 Stat 787, appears to have limited the authority to secure
fugitives in the Indian country to federal officers:
The superintendents, agents, and subagents shall endeavor to procure the
arrest and trial of all Indians accused of committing any crime, offense,
or misdemeanor, and of all other persons who may have committed crimes
or offenses within any State or Territory, and have fled into the Indian
cpuntry, either by demanding the same from the chiefs of the proper tribe,
or by such other means as the President may authorize. The President may
direct the military force of the United States to be employed in the appre-
hension of such Indians, and also in preventing or terminating hostilies be-
tween any of the Indian tribes. [R.S. § 2152 (1852)]
The statute speaks in terms of "demanding" the fugitive from the chief of the tribe and
is reminiscent of an extradition proceeding. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-30-02 (1960).
In an opinion by the United States Attorney General in 1877, the Solicitor-General
was of the opinion that the proper Indian agent should remove fugitives from the reser-
vation rather than the military forces. The opinion also noted that "[n]o doubt, upon ap-
plication by the civil authorities of Texas to the proper [Indian] agent, the fugitives in
question will be surrendered to justice." 15 Op. ATT'Y. GEN. 601, 602 (1877).
In 25 U.S.C. § 231 (1964), the states are given authority to enter the reservations
for the purpose of enforcing state laws concerning sanitation, quarantine, and compulsory
school attendance. But the state may enforce compulsory school attendance laws only if
the tribe elects to be governed by those laws. Sanitation and quarantine law enforcement
does not require the Indians' consent. This limited authority of state officers to enter the
reservation should not be taken as a carte blanche by the state for intrusion on reserva-
tion lands for all purposes, including the action taken In the instant case.
32. Ex Parte Morgan, 20 F. 298 (W.D. Ark. 1883).
33. Id. at 304, 305.
34. Id. at 305.
35. Id. at 306.
36. 43 Stat. 253 (1924), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(2) (1964).
37. Since extradition is provided for in the various national parks, supra note 18, a
part of the public domain just as Indian reservations are, there seems to be no valid
reason why the federal government cannot adopt some form of extradition provisions for
the reservations. An Indian reservation Is surely an equal sovereign with any of the na-
tional parks,
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nize the sovereignty of the reservations as political bodies within
the community of sovereign states comprising this country. This is
not to say that the reservations should enjoy equal sovereign status
with the states, but only that such degree of sovereignty as the
reservations possess should be recognized and respected.
But Ex Parte Morgan is apparently still alive. In 1941, the De-
partment of the Interior rendered the following statement:
If an Indian has fled from the reservation where he has
committed an offense and is within the jurisdiction of the
State, the question of extradition is the same whether or
not the State is the one in which the reservation is located.
In either case there can be no extradition unless State of-
ficers are authorized to extradite fugitives from Indian res-
ervations. It has long been decided that extradition by a
state is not a matter of discretion or comity but is governed
exclusively by the Constitution and laws of the United
States.88
The statement indicates that since the reservation officials have
no authority to request extradition (under the authority of Ex Parte
Morgan), neither does the state have such authority to extradite
Indians from the reservation. This supposed dual inability to bring
fugitives to justice is an untenable situation. But if the solution to
the problem can be found in allowing state officers to take an Indian
from the reservation without requesting the fugitive's surrender
from tribal authorities in accordance with the North Dakota Supreme
Court's decision in Fournier v. Roed, then the remedy should be
made mutual by allowing Indian police to make an arrest off the
reservation of a fugitive from their jurisdiction. Indeed, such
reciprocity is entirely logical if, as the court indicates, the reser-
vation is not extraterritorial to the state and the reservation boun-
daries have no special significance as far as law enforcement is
concerned.
In addition to asserting the state's sovereign power over the
reservation, the court held that no federal statute or treaty was
shown which precluded the state from taking the action in question. 9
An examination of the treaties affecting the Fort Totten reservation
indicates that no such impediment exists. But a federal statute
dating back to 1834 is quite helpful. The statute provides that:
If any Indian, belonging to any tribe in amity with the
United States, shall, . . . pass from Indian country into any
State or Territory inhabited by citizens of the United States,
38. 57 Interior Dec. 344, 345 (1941).
39. Fournier v. Roed, 161 N.W.2d 458, 465 (N.D. 1968).
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and there take, steal, or destroy, any horse, or other property
belonging to any citizen or inhabitant of the United States,
such citizen or inhabitant, . .. may make application to the
proper superintendent, agent, or subagent, who, upon being
furnished with the necessary documents and proofs, shall
. . . make application to the nation or tribe to which such
Indian shall belong, for satisfaction; and if such nation or
tribe shall neglect or refuse to make satisfaction, in a rea-
sonable time not exceeding twelve months, . . . such further
steps may be taken as shall be proper, in the opinion of
the President, to obtain satisfaction for the injury.40
The statute would seem to indicate that state officers cannot
enter the reservation to retrieve property stolen by an Indian off
the reservation but that a proper application must be made to the
tribe for satisfaction. If this is true as to property, should the state
have any greater authority to enter the reservation to arrest
the offender? If the reservation's boundaries limit the state's
authority to exercise its powers regarding property within the
reservation, it seems inconceivable that the same limitation, would
not be applied concerning persons.
The supreme court sought to reinforce its holding by alluding
to the fact that Indians are now citizens and therefore should obey
the laws of the state in force outside of the reservation.4 ' No one
can deny the propriety of that proposition, but the issue of the
Fournier case cannot be so circumscribed. What is at stake here
is not the avoidance by an Indian from state prosecution for his
offenses committed off the reservation, but rather whether the state
must recognize some degree of sovereignty and control of the tribal
government over the reservation's inhabitants. This is so since tribal
officials would undoubtedly turn an offender over to state authori-
ties for prosecution upon being shown probable cause to believe
that an offense has been committed by a member of the tribe.
But if the state may disregard any interest which the tribal govern-
ment has in the matter, as the instant decisions indicate, then the
sovereignty of tribal government has indeed been dealt a most
damaging blow.
BRUCE E. BOHLMAN
40. P.S. § 2156, 25 U.S.C. § 229 (1964).
41. Fournier v. Roed, 161 N.W.2d 458, 466 (N.D. 1968).
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